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I. Introduction
Abortion. It is a subject combining two issues that should
never come up at the dinner table: sex and religion. In countries
like the United States, where courts have made definitive decisions
regarding women's abortion rights, the topic generates heated
controversy.' Internationally, the topic draws even greater debate,
as abortion policies may differ among bordering states.2 In
Europe, women have started traveling from countries with strict
domestic abortion laws to other countries where abortions are
more widely permitted.3 Pro-choice advocates pushing for less
restrictive abortion laws have thus supported the creation of a
broader regional consensus on reproductive rights, a result that
would provide women with more choices-and eliminate any need
for extensive travel.4
This comment specifically considers the role of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in interpreting and developing
international law on reproductive rights. The ECtHR's decisions
have led to significant changes in the international field of
abortion through international treaty obligations and domestic
I See David Alton, The Paramount Human Right: The Right to Life, in FIFTY
YEARS AFTER THE DECLARATION: THE UNITED NATIONS' RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11,
12-14 (Teresa Wagner & Leslie Carbone eds., 2001) (citing DAVID ALTON, LIFE AFTER
DEATH (1997) (describing the divisive debate about abortion worldwide)).
2 Id.
3 See David Cole, "Going to England": Irish Abortion Law and the European
Community, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 113, 116 (1993) (describing England's
more liberal abortion laws and explaining how many people from countries with more
conservative abortion laws travel outside of their states, a phenomenon termed "going to
England").
4 See Danielle Nappi, NOTE: Demokracja and Aborcja: Poland's New
Democracy and the Tyranny of Women's Human Rights, 26 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 53,
54 (2005) (discussing how pro-choice advocates believe restrictions on abortion
discriminate against women who cannot afford to travel for an abortion).
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law.5 This comment demonstrates that even though A., B. and C.
v. Ireland' was not Europe's Roe v. Wade,' the 2011 case of R.R.
v. Polana' illustrates how the ECtHR continues to expand the
scope of rights available to women in asserting their reproductive
freedoms.'
Historically, the ECtHR has invoked Article 8 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("the Convention on Human Rights")'o primarily in the
context of reproductive rights, but cases like R.R. v. Poland have
also used Article 3 to grant relief to a woman's claim concerning
reproductive rights." This comment argues that abortion
advocates should implement an "Article 3 strategy" when pushing
for greater reproductive freedoms. Such a strategy would use
legal claims under Article 3 to continue to make progress in the
field of international law, forcing domestic laws to change and
consequently expanding women's reproductive rights
internationally.
Part I of this comment sets the context for the reproductive
rights case of R.R. v. Poland by considering the overall abortion
rights debate, domestic abortion law throughout Europe, and
abortion laws in Poland, particularly. Next, Part II explains the
international legal framework from which abortion advocates can
use international treaty obligations and the European Convention
on Human Rights to further their arguments. Articles 2, 3, 8, and
13 of the Convention are described in Part III. Then, in Part IV,
this comment explores the reproductive rights case recently before
the ECtHR, R.R. v. Poland. After summarizing the facts and the
5 Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right- International
and Regional Standards, 8 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 249, 261 (2008) (discussing substantive
and procedural protections for abortion under the ECtHR.).
6 A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102332.
7 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8 R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104911.
9 See id at 42-51 (discussing several bases for a woman's rights in relation to
abortion).
10 European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter European Convention].
11 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. 25.
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Court's analysis, this comment concludes that abortion advocates
should employ an "Article 3 strategy" to push for changes in
domestic abortion laws throughout Europe.
II. International Reproductive Rights
A. The Debate
Across the world, people are fighting for reproductive
freedom,12 as they have been for years." Both sides of the debate
agree that abortion relates to "our treatment of the vulnerable and
powerless."l 4 One side believes the unborn child is the class that
should be protected; the other side believes the woman should be
the protected class.s
The strongest advocates of pro-life law and policy are the
Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church. 6 The Church has taken
the position that abortion is equal to murder." Such a connection
"makes it difficult for the modem leaders of the Church to stray
from this framework;" modem pro-choice advocates often use
religious rhetoric in discussions with those who consider
themselves pro-life."
The abortion debate is also motivated by non-religious
concerns. Some who oppose abortion focus on the problems it
causes with regard to maternal health and other issues like
children's safety. 9  For example, Lord David Alton, a British
politician who has written extensively in opposition to abortion,
12 Like Berta E. Hernndez, I define reproductive freedom as "the individual's
choice to reproduce or not to reproduce." Berta E. HemAndez, To Bear or not to Bear:
Reproductive Freedom as a Human Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (1991). Using
this definition, the term includes the right both to have and to refrain from having an
abortion. Id.
13 Alton, supra note 1, at 14.
14 Id. at 13.
15 Nappi, supra note 4, at 54.
16 Id. at 53.
17 Rishonda Fleishman, The Battle Against Reproductive Rights: The Impact of the
Catholic Church on Abortion Law in Both International and Domestic Arenas, 14
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 277, 281 (2000).
18 Id
19 See Alton, supra note 1, at 14 (noting the negative effects of abortion on
women, men, and children).
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contends that abortion leads to physical and psychological
problems for women.20 As abortion rates have risen, he notes that
"the incidence of child abuse before and after birth has increased,
as has the abuse of women;" furthermore, he argues, "men use
abortion simply to avoid the responsibilities of fatherhood."2 1
In contrast, pro-choice advocates focus on abortion as a
fundamental human right stemming from a woman's right to
control her own body. These advocates assert that "pregnancy and
the decision to either continue or end a pregnancy are private
matters" that a woman should be permitted to decide for herself
without government intervention. 2 2  The pro-choice side of the
debate also cites statistics indicating how denial of "legal abortion
only pushes the practice underground," which means more women
risk death from "an unsanitary, unsafe procedure." 23 In addition,
pro-choice advocates often believe that laws restricting abortion
interfere with a woman's right to travel, specifically to countries
"where abortions are legal or to a private clinic."2 4
B. Domestic Abortion Laws
Although many countries recognize the right to reproductive
freedom, 25 others have yet to recognize abortion and related
reproductive rights.26 An example of a country that falls
20 Id
21 Id
22 Nappi, supra note 4, at 54.
23 Id
24 Id
25 The United States, for example, recognized abortion as part of the right to
privacy in Roe v. Wade. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT,
PROBLEMS 55 (5th ed. 2010). Thirty European states also now provide "abortion on
demand" in the first trimester, which means that women can choose to have an abortion
without needing to provide a reason. Elizabeth Wicks, A. B. C. v Ireland: Abortion Law
under the European Convention on Human Rights, 11 HuM. RTs. L. REv. 556, 557
(2011).
26 In some form or another, all but one of the countries that recognize the
European Convention of Human Rights also recognize a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy; the only country that does not recognize such a right is Ireland. See Natalie
Klashtorny, Comment, Ireland's Abortion Law: An Abuse of International Law, 10
TEMP. INT'L & Comp. L.J. 419, 437 (1996) (describing reproductive rights in Ireland);
see generally ABORTION POLITICS, WOMEN'S MOVEMENTS, AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE
(Dorothy McBride Stetson ed., 2001) (particularly detailing how abortion policies have
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somewhere in the middle is Poland.2 7 Unlike England, a country
that grants its citizens the right to an abortion,2 8 Poland does not
automatically grant women the right to intentionally terminate a
pregnancy,29 though Polish law does permit it in certain
circumstances when a woman may choose abortion over giving
birth.3 0 Presently, Poland is one of three European countries with
the strictest abortion laws, comparable only to Ireland and Malta.3 1
C. Poland and Abortion Law
Poland has self-identified as a Catholic nation for over a
thousand years,32 a fact which provides context for abortion
advocates' struggle for greater reproductive rights in Poland.
Around the time of the Renaissance, for example, Poland believed
itself to be "the protective rampart of Christian Europe."
Catholicism and Polish identity were interchangeable: "The
identification as Polish was [connected] fundamentally to the
Catholic confession. The demonstrative Catholic confession of
faith became a patriotic duty in public life."34
Such a religious mentality continues to affect Poland's laws on
abortion today. Research focusing on Poland's abortion laws
consistently mentions Catholicism, because the two are so closely
developed in the European countries of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and the Netherlands); Stephen L. Isaacs, Reproductive
Rights 1983: An International Survey, 14 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 311 (1983)
(providing an overview of abortion laws throughout Europe).
27 See generally Nappi, supra note 4 (explaining abortion law in Poland).
28 See David Cole, supra note 3, at 116 (describing England's more liberal
abortion laws and explaining how many people from countries with more conservative
abortion laws travel there, a phenomenon termed "going to England").
29 See generally Nappi, supra note 4 (detailing Poland's domestic abortion laws).
30 Alicia Czerwinski, Sex, Politics, and Religion: The Clash Between Poland and
the European Union over Abortion, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 653, 658 (2004); see
generally Klashtorny, supra note 26, at 419-30 (describing Irish abortion law).
31 Nappi, supra note 4, at 55.
32 See ADAM ZAMOYSKI, THE POLISH WAY: A THOUSAND YEAR HISTORY OF THE
POLES AND THEIR CULTURE 10, 23 (1988) (stating that the country was officially
converted in the year 966).
33 Gerhard Wagner, Nationalism and Cultural Memory in Poland: The European
Union Turns East, 17 INT'L J. POL., CULTURE, & SOc'Y 191, 202 (2003).
34 Id. at 203.
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linked:35 the Polish Constitution directly refers to the Vatican,
providing that relations between the country and Roman Catholic
Church "shall be determined by international treaty concluded
with the Holy See, and by statute."36 This connection between
church and state has influenced the development of abortion laws
favoring pro-life policies.
Strict Polish abortion laws developed in the early 1990s, after
the fall of communism." Current law, the 1993 Act of Family
Planning, Human Embryo Protection and Conditions of
Permissibility of Abortion,3 9 appears less polarized. It allows for
abortions in cases such as life-threatening situations, fetal
deformation, or pregnancies resulting from rape or incest.4 0
Nevertheless, the law does not provide any procedural guidelines
for how to grant abortions in such circumstances, 4 1 and hospitals
often refuse to carry out any abortions-a practice which has not
been challenged by the government.42 Czerwinski notes that "[i]n
practice[,] ... obtaining an abortion even in [legally acceptable]
35 See Czerwinski, supra note 30, at 658 (noting that Poland's current abortion law
"reflects Catholic beliefs"); see also Nappi, supra note 4, at 54 ("With a seemingly
heavy hand, the Roman Catholic Church used the new focus as an opportunity to
influence the changing environment of post-communist Poland and the construction of
the new constitution.").
36 Nappi, supra note 4, at 56.
37 Id. at 71.
38 Ray Furlong, Poland Set for Abortion Battle, BBC (Oct. 3, 2011),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1577208.stm. Interestingly, despite Poland's long
history of ties to Catholicism, its strict abortion laws only developed in the 1990s. Id.
39 Nappi, supra note 4, at 58.
40 Furlong, supra note 38; see also Czerwinski, supra note 30, at 658 (describing
Polish abortion law).
41 R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 171 (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104911.
42 Furlong, supra note 38; see also Andrzej Kulczycki, Abortion Policy in
Postcommunist Europe: The Conflict in Poland, 21 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 471, 474
(1995) (explaining that other systemic measures, such as the increasing costs of abortion,
have advanced an anti-abortion agenda in Poland; for example, "the cost of a private
abortion reportedly tripled [after a new medical code of ethics was enacted in May 1992]
to between $250 and $800, the latter figure several times the average monthly salary, as
many health facilities stopped providing abortions"); Poland, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS
(2003), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/Poland.pdf (providing
background information on how the Polish government structures its health laws and
implementing agencies).
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circumstances is seldom permitted."43 Women often find it
difficult even to receive medical tests during pregnancy.44
In 1996, Poland adopted an amendment to its 1993 abortion
law.45 The amendment permitted abortions for women in
"difficult living conditions" or "precarious personal situations up
until the 12th week of pregnancy."46 Less than a year after the
amendment's adoption, however, it was overruled for its
unconstitutionality.47 Even though the Polish Constitution refers
to the country's Catholic roots, the text does not specifically
mention the term abortion.48  Nevertheless, Article 38 of the
Constitution does state that the country "shall ensure the legal
protection of the life of every human being."49 Pro-life advocates
therefore argue that the text indeed offers protection against
abortion, although they would prefer the language reflect the
definition of a fetus as a human being.o
Pro-choice advocates, on the other hand, seek to sway the
debate through Article 47 of the Polish Constitution," which
addresses citizens' right to privacy: "everyone shall have the right
to the legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour
43 Czerwinski, supra note 30, at 658.
44 Nappi, supra note 4, at 59. For example, in 1999, Barbara W. became pregnant.
Id. As she had previously delivered a child with a debilitating genetic disease, she
requested a pre-natal test of the fetus so that she would know if the fetus had genetic
deformities. Id. Although the right to genetic testing is a legal right when there is a
predisposition for genetic disease, two leaders of one hospital denied her request. Id.
Later, W. was able to obtain the testing, but she could no longer legally terminate her
pregnancy due to the amount of time that had passed. Id. Although W. and her husband
sued the hospital and doctors, "the case was suspended on its first day for collection of
more documentation," and "no further information can be found" about the lawsuit. Id.
45 Nappi, supra note 4, at 58.
46 Id. (quoting U.N. Population Div., DEP'T OF ECON. AND Soc. AFFAIRS,
ABORTION POLICY: A GLOBAL REVIEW (2002)).
47 Id.
48 Id. at 56.
49 Id. (citing U.S. Dep't of State, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES-2002: Poland (2003), avaliable at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18385.htm).
50 Id. at 56.
51 Nappi, supra note 4 (citing Women's Rights in the Constitution, WOMEN'S
RIGHTS CTR. (1998), http://temida.free.ngo.pl/constitution.htm).
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and good reputation to make decisions about his personal life."52
One way pro-choice advocates have used this language to garner
support for their side is through scholarly articles such as those
published by the Women's Rights Center.53 Pro-choice advocates
also use this article of the Polish Constitution in litigation. When
Ms. R.R. brought her lawsuit against the state of Poland initially,
for example, in R.R. v. Poland, she contended that Article 47 gave
her a right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.5 4
Today, even though Poland permits abortion only in rare cases,
the practice continues. Statistics show that the number of
abortions performed in the country has "drastically decreased
every year" since the fall of communism, when the country's strict
abortion laws were created." However, the number of "abortions
actually occurring through illegal methods is as high as 200,000 a
year."" Seemingly, therefore, many women have gained access to
abortion, even in situations when it is prohibited by domestic
law." The case of R.R. v. Poland suggests that more women will
continue to seek access to abortion through international treaty
obligations when they are unable to do so through their country's
domestic law.s
52 Id. (citing Konstytucja Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej [CONSTITUTION]. art. 47.).
53 WOMEN'S RIGHTS CTR., supra note 51.
54 See R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64 (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104911.
(explaining the domestic law at issue in Ms. R.R.'s case).
55 Czerwinski, supra note 30, at 658. The rate of abortion was 108,367 per year in
1989, while only 159 legal abortions were performed in 2002. William Johnston,
Historical Abortion Statistics, Poland, (Mar. 11, 2012),
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/ab-poland.html.
56 Czerwinski, supra note 30, at 658 (citing Mindy Kay Bricker, Anti-Abortion
Group Inspired by Slovak Push, PRAGUE POST, Apr. 10, 2003, available at
http://www.praguepost.com/P03/2003/Art/0410/print template.php).
57 Accurate abortion data is difficult to find, as many abortions are not reported.
Statistics indicating that abortions occur do not delineate how women receive abortions,
but presumably some women obtain abortions in Poland through illegal measures while
others travel outside of Poland to obtain abortions in other countries. See generally Cole,
supra note 3 (describing how women travel outside their home countries to obtain
abortions).
58 See infra Part IV.
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III. International Legal Framework
A. International Treaty Obligations
International treaty obligations may protect a woman's right to
abortion even in countries like Poland, where domestic law does
not protect reproductive freedom.59 The term "human rights" first
entered the realm of international law in 1945 under the United
Nations Charter, a universal treaty made by member states.o
Since then, human rights have been further developed through
treaty bodies such as the Human Rights Committee, the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
The right to abortion is not directly addressed in international
treaties as a fundamental human right.62 Instead, it is recognized
as part of the fundamental right to privacy. As early as 1948, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights described the right as
freedom from "arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence." 3 Using similar language, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights also specifically refer to a
right to privacy.64
Despite the fact that international treaties mention a
fundamental right to privacy, some critics do not believe this topic
covers the right to an elective abortion.6 5 William Saunders, a
59 See generally Herndndez, supra note 12 (explaining how various treaties
interact with reproductive rights).
60 Roza Pati, States' Positive Obligations with Respect to Human Trafficking: The
European Court ofHuman Rights Breaks New Ground in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia,
29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 79, 103 (2011).
61 See generally Kerstin Mechlem, Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation ofHuman
Rights, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 905 (2009) (describing human rights developments
with respect to these particular treaties).
62 See generally Mindy Jane Roseman & Alice M. Miller, Normalizing Sex and its
Discontents: Establishing Sexual Rights in International Law, 34 HARv. J.L. & GENDER
313, 341 (2011) (explaining how reproductive rights are protected through international
laws).
63 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/217(III), art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948). The Universal Declaration binds those
members of the United Nations who have ratified it. Id.
64 Herndndez, supra note 12, at 314.
65 William L. Saunders, Neither by Treaty, Nor by Custom: Through the Doha
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prolific author of articles on bioethics, is one such critic,
articulating the belief that reproductive rights are not covered by
"hard law," which is legally binding for domestic courts. 66  He
believes that pro-choice advocates are mistaken in their reliance
on international treaties, as they do not particularly address
women's right to an abortion. 67 Instead, he argues that pro-choice
advocates can use only "soft law," or law that is not created by all
members initially but instead is "a text of persuasive or horatory
weight." 68
One example of "soft law" is the use of consensus
statements.69 Consensus statements created at the 1994
International Conference on Population and Development and the
1995 Fourth World UN Conference on Women clearly include the
right to abortion as a fundamental right.o Although these
consensus statements are "soft law," scholars argue that they
represent the international community's view on reproductive
freedom as a fundamental right that should be recognized by
domestic law." Furthermore, such "soft law" often becomes
binding law.72 An analysis of whether the fundamental right to
privacy definitively encompasses the right to abortion is outside
Declaration, the World Rejects Claimed International Rights to Abortion and Same-Sex
Marriage, Affirming Traditional Understandings of Human Rights, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 67, 75 (2011) (citing Richard G. Wilkins & Jacob Reynolds, Law and Culture:
International Law and the Right to Life, 4 AvE MARIA L. REv. 123, 154-57 (2006))
(arguing that pro-choice advocates do not have a basis for reproductive freedoms within
these treaties).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Roseman & Miller, supra note 62, at 337.
69 A.E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48
INT'L & COmP. L. Q. 901, 903 (1999).
70 Zampas & Gher, supra note 5, at 252.
71 Id. at 253.
72 Wilkins & Reynolds, supra note 65, at 130 (describing how "expectations grow
and norms harden .... what begins as soft law is transmuted into hard law, so even if
there is a dearth of hard law about these reproductive freedoms, hard law may develop
soon enough." (internal quotations omitted)). But see Saunders, supra note 65, at 75
(countering this argument by stating that soft law is not "law at all, but rather a set of
documents that at most provide evidence of the norms of international customary law").
Even though institutions like the European Court of Human Rights are referred to as
courts, Saunders points out that their decisions are "generally advisory or aspirational
and [are] not to be directly relied upon by [national] courts." Id.
6612013]
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the scope of this comment, but case law pertaining to reproductive
rights has come before the European Court of Human Rights." In
some of these cases,74 the ECtHR has used an international treaty
to expand the zone of privacy for individuals seeking to make
reproductive health decisions. 6
Sexual rights have also emerged more prolifically in the past
five to ten years with increased international interest groups and
changes in cultural beliefs.77 In many cases, these groups'
statements have also linked the right to privacy with the right to
reproductive freedom.
B. European Convention on Human Rights
European citizens who feel that their fundamental legal rights
have been violated have several avenues for redress. Generally,
citizens contest laws or remedies directly within their country's
legal system through the domestic judicial process.7 9 If the
citizen's country is a member of the Council of Europe,"
however, that citizen may also apply to be heard before the
73 See infra Part II.
74 See, e.g., R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104911 (using the
Convention on Human rights to establish privacy rights in the context of abortion).
75 European Convention, supra note 10.
76 Case law like R.R. v. Poland implies that Saunders' thesis is incorrect; pro-
choice advocates can rely on the "hard law" of an international treaty in order to advance
their positions. See generally, R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (using "hard law"
to establish reproductive rights under Article 3 of the European Convention).
77 Roseman & Miller, supra note 62, at 341.
78 See generally Herndndez, supra note 12, at 329-35 (1991) (describing how
various international treaties have linked the right to privacy with reproductive rights).
For a description of how the right to privacy and the right to abortion have been linked in
the United States, see also IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT,
PROBLEMS 55 (5th ed. 2010).
79 See generally PHILIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (John Wadham ed., 2005) (mentioning alternative options to the Court).
80 The Council of Europe exists as an organization for "intergovernmental and
parliamentary co-operation. Geographically, it is now the most extensive European
political organization, comprising 41 member states." Andrew Drzemczewski, Fact-
finding as Part of Effective Implementation: the Strasbourg Experience, in THE UN
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 115, 115 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed.,
2000).
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ECtHR." The ECtHR determines whether the Convention on
Human Rights has been violated.8 2
1. Jurisdiction of the Court
The Council of Europe requires all members to ratify the
Convention on Human Rights.83 As of 2012, all Council of
Europe members have ratified it.84 Poland, for example, ratified
the Convention in 1993, two years after joining the Council.
However, neither the Council nor the Convention specifically
requires Council member states to incorporate the Convention into
their domestic law.86
Although all Council states have ratified the Convention,
member noncompliance with ECtHR rulings is still a problem."
The Council of Europe has a special department88 to ensure that
81 LEACH, supra note 79.
82 See Drzemczewski, supra note 80, at 117 ("The procedure of [referring an
alleged breach of the European Convention] developed in two stages: before the
European Commission and, depending on the case, before the European Court of Human
Rights . . . .").
83 Eur. Consult. Ass., Honouring of commitments entered into by member states
when joining the Council of Europe, 2d Sess., Doc. No. 7037 (1994), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/TA94/ERES 1031 .HTM ("[T]he
ratification procedure should normally be completed within one year after accession to
the Statute and signature of the Convention."); see also The European Convention on
Human Rights, COUNCIL OF EuR. (2012), http://www.coe.int/lportal/web/coe-
portal/what-we-do/human-rights/european-
convention?dynLink=true&layoutd=20&dlgroupld=10226&fromArticleld= (explaining
how the Convention binds members of the Council of Europe).
84 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE TREATY OFFICE (Sept. 09, 2012), http://conventions.coe.int./Treaty/
Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=1 94&CM=8&DF=09/09/2012&CL=ENG.
85 Poland, COUNCIL OF EUR. (2012), http://hub.coe.int/web/coe-
portal/country/poland?dynLink-true&layoutld=160&dlgroupld=10226&fromArticleld=.
86 Francis G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE
COLLOQUIUM OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE 31, 52 (Rudolf
Bernhardt & John Anthony Joloqicz eds., 1985).
87 See THOMAS HAMMARBERG, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: NO GROUNDS FOR
COMPLACENCY 238 (2011), available at http://www.coe.int/t/commissioner/
Viewpoints/09083 _en.asp (describing how some states may not enforce judgments
immediately-or at all).
88 Documents prepared by the Department for the Execution of Court Judgments
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ECtHR decisions are executed, but it cannot force states to change
their domestic law.89 Nevertheless, many member states respond
favorably to the ECtHR's decisions.90 Statistics indicate strong
judicial respect for the Court and demonstrate the influence the
Court has over its members' domestic law;9 1 domestic law
changes frequently as a result of ECtHR opinions.9 2
2. ECtHR Procedure
The European Court of Human Rights is governed by "a
number of judges equal to that of member States of the Council of
Europe."93  Seven judges preside over each case, 94 unless a case is
"relinquished" to a grand chamber of seventeen judges. 95 In cases
where a nation is a party, a judge representing that nation will be
present.96 The Court also elects the President and Vice-President,
who sit on every case as ex officio members.97 The President has
the power to ask other Council of Europe members to submit
can be found at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/default-en.asp.
89 See HAMMARBERG, supra note 87, at 239-40.
90 Anne-Marie Slaughter, 4 0 Anniversary Perspective: Judicial Globalization, 40
VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1109 (2000); see also Colm O'Cinneide, In Defence of the
Strasbourg Court, UK CONSTITUTIONAL LAw GRP. (June 13, 2011),
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/06/13/colm-o'cinneide-in-defence-of-the-strasbourg-
court/; Antoine Buyse, An Unfair Judgment on the European Court of Human Rights,
THE GUARDIAN (June 14, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/
libertycentral/201 1/jun/14/attacks-european-court-of-human-rights-unjustified (noting
that the Court has been acting in its current capacity for decades).
91 Buyse, supra note 90 (citing Bayak Cali & Alice Wyss, The Legitimacy of the
European Court of Human Rights: The View from the Ground (May 2, 2011),
http://ecthrproject.files.wordpress.com/201 1/04/ecthrlegitimacyreport.pdf).
92 Slaughter, supra note 90; see also Agnieszka Mrozik, Poland's Politics of
Abortion, OPEN DEMOCRACY (Dec. 13, 2001), http://www.opendemocracy.net/agnieszka-
mrozik/polands-politics-of-abortion (suggesting that Polish law on abortion may become
more liberal this coming year, perhaps in response to the ECtHR cases of Tysiac v.
Poland and R.R. v. Poland).
93 Francis G. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE
COLLOQUIUM OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE 31, 37 (Rudolf
Bernhardt & John Anthony Joloqicz eds., 1985).
94 Id. at 38.
95 LEACH, supra note 79, at 54.
96 Id.
97 Jacobs, supra note 93, at 38.
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written comments regarding particular issues and determine the
order of the docket."
The ECtHR employs three procedures to evaluate whether the
Convention has been followed.99 First, the ECtHR can produce
advisory opinions interpreting provisions of the Convention."'o
The ECtHR rarely issues these opinions, however, in part because
they "may not deal with the content or scope of the substantive
Convention rights."o' The ECtHR can also resolve inter-state
cases, where one member state brings a claim against another
state.'0 2  This self-policing mechanism has been "remarkably
under-used," a reflection of "the broader realities of inter-state
relations."''0 3 The third mechanism used by the ECtHR is the
individual application process.'04 Scholars consider this individual
complaint mechanism to be the most authoritative source from the
ECtHR, as compared to other mechanisms such as general
comments or advisory opinions. os
Individual applications also set the ECtHR apart from other
human rights bodies such as the United Nations Committee on the
Rights of the Child, an entity that does not grant fact-specific
individual decisions.o' After evaluating an individual's case, the
ECtHR may declare a violation of the Convention and ask a state
to directly compensate an individual.'0 7 In this way, both the
applicant and the state can be a party to the judicial proceeding.o08
98 Id. at 39.
99 LEACH, supra note 79, at 15-16.
100 Id. at 15.
101 Id
102 Id. at 16.
103 See id. (discussing why this system has not been used more frequently).
104 Id
105 Roseman & Miller, supra note 62, at 343 (citing David Weissbrodt, The Role of
the Human Rights Committee in Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian Law, 31 U.
PA. J. INT'L L. 1185, 1190 (2010)).
106 David Weissbrodt, Joseph C. Hansen & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child in Interpreting and Developing International
Humanitarian Law, 24 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 118 (2011).
107 MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (2007).
108 REN PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAw 49
(2002) (explaining that in other proceedings, such as those before the Human Rights
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The ECtHR can also ask a nation to provide an "effective
remedy," which "often means a change in law."' 9 According to
Michael Goldhaber, a law professor and writer for The American
Lawyer, under both approaches, the ECtHR endeavors to shame
European nations into compensating the citizen for his or her
injuries."o This "shaming" power is an effective enforcement
mechanism because it provides a direct opportunity for relief when
the Convention is violated;"' most researchers agree that the
ECtHR is successful in providing relief."2
To make decisions, the ECtHR also employs a consensus
model that draws on member states' interpretations of human
rights.' To determine whether there is consensus on a particular
issue, the ECtHR considers European countries' "domestic
statutes, international treaties and regional legislation," expert
opinion, and the views of the European public." 4 In this way, the
ECtHR attempts to include its members in creating policy and
enacting social change for Europe."'
Even some countries that do not adopt the Convention have
incorporated ECtHR opinions into their jurisprudence, indicating
that the EctHR has broader international support."' In a
"landmark decision finding the death penalty unconstitutional,"
Commission or UNESCO, the individual only provides information to the tribunal and is
not a party to the proceedings).
109 GOLDHABER, supra note 107, at 5.
110 Id.
III Roseman & Miller, supra note 62, at 343-44 (quoting Fact Sheet No.7/Rev.1,
Complaints Procedure, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet7Rev.len.pdf (last
visited Oct. 26, 2012)) ("Decisions rendered in these quasi-judicial settings are
understood to be authoritative judgments for the state in question and also provide
guidance for other states.").
112 GOLDHABER, supra note 107, at 6; see also LEACH, supra note 79, at 6 (noting
that "[t]he Convention is considered to be one of the most successful human rights
systems in the world, particularly because of its enforcement mechanisms and its
membership"). But see Drzemczewski, supra note 80, at 118 (noting that the Court
could do more for more systemic violations of human rights).
113 Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 134 (1993).
114 Id. at 139.
115 See id. at 134.
116 Slaughter, supra note 90, at 1109.
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the Supreme Court of South Africa cited ECtHR decisions.1 17
Courts in Zimbabwe and Jamaica have also relied on ECtHR case
law."' Therefore, R.R. v. Poland may provide not only an
understanding of international treaties but also an analysis of how
countries may adopt lessons from the ECtHR in developing
domestic law.
VI. The European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention is the governing document for
Council of Europe human rights cases." 9 When deciding whether
the Convention has been violated, the court first considers the
scope of the applicant's claim and whether the claim contains a
protected interest.'2 0  Then, the court determines whether the
government took appropriate measures to protect this interest.121
This comment analyzes Articles 2, 3, 8, and 13 of the
Convention and describes how they have been used in
reproductive rights decisions. Part III of this paper then connects
the ECtHR's previous case law pertaining to these Articles to the
R.R. v. Poland case. Since R.R. v. Poland is the first reproductive
'17 Id. at 1110 (referencing State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) (S.
Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1995/3.pdf).
118 Id. (quoting Ncube v. State, 1988 (2) SA 702 (Zim.)); Pratt v. Attorney General
for Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769 (P.C. 1993) (en banc), available at
http://eji.org/eji/files/Pratt%20and%20Morgan%20v.%20Jamaica.pdf, quoted in
Slaughter, supra note 90, at 1110. While the question remains whether this case law
should be followed, it is clear that courts around the world are following ECtHR
opinions. See Slaughter, supra note 90, at 1109-10. In 2003, the Supreme Court of the
United States cited international tribunal briefs and a brief from the former United
Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights in Lawrence v. Texas. Wilkins &
Reynolds, supra note 65, at 133. The Supreme Court has also relied on international
treaties to which it is not a member; in the 2005 Roper v. Simmons case, Justice Kennedy
cited a United Nations treaty that the United States Senate never ratified in his majority
opinion. Id. at 132.
119 The Court in Brief EUR. COURT OF HUM. RTS.,
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DFO74FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-
404AAF5BC585/0/ENGCourt in brief.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012).
120 See DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O'BOYLE & CHRIS WARBRICK, LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 302-05 (1995) (explaining how ECtHR case
law breaks down Article 8's first sentence into four segments: private life, family life,
home, and correspondence). While some of these segments overlap, the court
traditionally analyzes cases in one of these four sections.
121 Id
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rights case to successfully use Article 3,122 this Comment argues
that pro-choice advocates should not only continue to utilize the
framework of Article 8, but should also invoke Article 3 when
litigating reproductive rights cases.
A. Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights
Article 2 of the Convention specifically mentions a person's
"right to life"l23 as "no one should be deprived of his life
intentionally." 24  However, the ECtHR has elected not to decide
whether a fetus fits under Article 2's definition of a "person,"' 2 5
despite the fact a case was brought on that specific issue in
2004.126 Even though pro-life advocates have argued that a fetus
should be considered a person, 127 the ECtHR has decided
reproductive rights issues primarily under Article 8.128
B. Article 3 ofEuropean Convention on Human Rights
Article 3 of the Convention states "no one shall be subjected to
122 R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64 (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-104911.
123 European Convention, supra note 10, art. 2.
124 Id. The full text of Article 2 reads: "Everyone's right to life shall be protected
by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a
sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided
by law. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this
article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest
or to prevent escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the
purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection." Id.
125 FRANCIS G. JACOBS, ROBIN WHITE & CLARE OVEY, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 164 (Robin White & Clare Ovey eds., 5th ed. 2010).
126 See Jakob Pichon, Does the Unborn Child Have a Right to Life? The Insufficient
Answer of the European Court of Human Rights in the Judgment, 7 GERMAN L.J. 433,
436 (2006) (explaining the decision in Vo v. France and stating that "the ECtHR was
convinced that it is neither desirable, nor possible, to answer in the abstract the question
whether an unborn child is covered by the concept 'everyone' for the purposes of Article
2 of the Convention").
127 See VO v. France, 2004-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 67, 93 ("The applicant asserted that
the point at which life began had a universal meaning and definition. Even though that
was in the nature of things, it was now scientifically proven that all life began at
fertilization.").
128 See infra Part 11.B.3 and text accompanying notes 157-209.
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torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."l 29 A
threshold level of inhuman or degrading treatment must be met for
the ECtHR to find an Article 3 violation; this threshold is defined
relatively and thus "depends on all the circumstances of the case,
such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects
and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the
victim."3 o Although Article 3 does not on its face require that
courts find intent to impose liability, the European Court of
Human Rights has held on a number of occasions that the
Convention requires intent. 13' Nevertheless, as the ECtHR in
Ireland v. UK 3 2  held, in essence, "the crucial distinction lies in
the degree of suffering caused." 33
Cases where the ECtHR has found "inhuman" treatment
violating Article 3 have centered on assaults,'34 psychological
interrogation techniques,' conditions of confinement, 3 6 and
extradition or deportation.137  Although very little case law
129 European Convention, supra note 10, art. 3.
130 Ireland v. UK, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 162 (1978), quoted in HARRIS,
O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 56.
131 Compare European Convention, supra note 10, art. 3 (stating that "[n]o one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" but not
explicitly requiring intent) and Peers v. Greece, 2001-111 Eur. Ct. H. R. 275, 297 ("In
light of the foregoing, the Court considers that in the present case there is no evidence
that there was a positive intention of humiliating or debasing the applicant. However,
the Court notes that, although the question whether the purpose of the treatment was to
humiliate or debase the victim is a factor to be taken into account, the absence of any
such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of violation of Article 3"), with
Dikme v. Turkey, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 223 (holding that intent was required to
support finding an Article 3 violation).
132 Ireland v. UK, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66 (1978).
133 HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 62.
134 See id. at 62-65 (summarizing ECtHR case law on Article 3 as it pertains to
assaults); see e.g., Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) (1992) (involving
allegations of assault by police officers).
135 See HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 65-66 (describing
ECtHR case law about psychological interrogation techniques); see e.g., Ireland v. UK,
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
136 See HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 66-72 (summarizing
ECtHR case law on conditions of detention); see e.g., Cyprus v. Turkey, 200 1-IV Eur.
Ct. H.R. 1.
137 See HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 73-80 (explaining
ECtHR case law on inhuman treatment and particularly mentioning extradition and
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addresses inhuman punishment, case law does suggest that the
same requirements for inhuman treatment apply (such as the
extent of the victim's "physical or mental suffering" and whether a
"person of normal sensibilities" of the victim's "sex, age, health"
would be similarly affected"'); nevertheless, the action in question
must be for the purpose of punishing the victim.13 9
In interpreting Article 3's prohibition of "degrading
treatment," the ECtHR has focused on the level of humiliation
suffered by the victim.'4 0 Specifically, the ECtHR asks whether
someone of normal sensibilities, "of the applicant's sex, age,
health, etc[.] ... would be grossly humiliated in all the
circumstances of the case." 4 ' Case law on degrading treatment
includes instances of detentionl4 and racial discrimination.14
According to scholars Harris, O'Boyle, and Warbrick, whether
discrimination against other classes of people falls under Article 3
is less clear.'" They explain, "Legislation discriminating against
illegitimate children and their parents was held in Marckx v.
Belgium'45 not to be degrading treatment, contrary to Article 3."l46
However, since Marckx, "discrimination against children born out
of wedlock has been identified as a kind of discrimination given
special protection by Article 14, as has sexual discrimination."l47
Therefore, "[i]t is arguable that discrimination on any of these
grounds, all of which concern personal characteristics, is
degrading[,] contrary to Article 3."l48
Much of the case law defining "degrading treatment" under
Article 3 of the Convention concerns corporal punishment in
deportation claims); see e.g., Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).
138 HARRIs, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 80.
139 Id.
140 See id
141 Id. at 81.
142 Id. at 83.
143 Id. at 81.
144 HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 83.
145 Marckx v. Belgium, App. No. 6833/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330 (1979).
146 See HARRIs, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 83.
147 Id.
148 Id
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schools.14 9 Although applicants have claimed Article 3 violations
of their reproductive freedoms in the past,"o R.R. v. Poland is the
first Article 3 reproductive freedom claim to succeed."
C. Article 8 of the European Convention ofHuman Rights
Article 8 of the Convention specifically focuses on "private
and family life, home ... and correspondence."S 2  Although a
state primarily has a negative obligation not to interfere in an
individual's life, in 1994, the court stated that there "may in
addition be positive obligations inherent in 'effective' respect for
family life."' 53 Since then, the ECtHR has held that there are in
fact positive obligations inherent in Article 8.15 Furthermore,
these obligations may require states to impose "measures . . . in
order to secure the enjoyment of an Article 8 right."' 5  To assess
whether a positive obligation exists, the ECtHR considers the "fair
balance between the general interests of the community and the
interests of the individual."' 56
1. Case law on Article 8 and Reproductive Freedom
The majority of the ECtHR's reproductive freedom decisions
rely on Article 8 of the Convention. When considering an
applicant's Article 8 abortion claim(s), the court focuses on Article
149 Id. at 86.
150 See, e.g., A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 214
(Dec. 16, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102332;
Tysiac v. Poland, 2007-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 219.
151 R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64 (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104911. This case, and the
court's Article 3 analysis, is examined below. See infra Part IV.
152 Article 8 reads: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
European Convention, supra note 10, art. 8.
153 HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 302 (citing Kroon v
Netherlands, 297-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 56 (1994)).
154 See id at 303 (emphasis added).
155 Id. at 304.
156 LEACH, supra note 79, at 285.
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8's privacy provision,57 analyzing the facts and circumstances of
an individual's case to determine whether an individual's "private
life" has been disrespected."' While the court has not
conclusively defined "private life," it has considered such issues
as a person's right to determine the circumstances of a child's
birth,'59 a person's mental health,16 0 and even a person's business
relationships.16 1
In Briiggemann & Scheuten v. Federal Republic of
Germany,'62 the ECtHR extended the Article 8 definition of
private life to cover issues of reproductive freedom.'6 3 In
Briiggemann, two women brought an action before the European
Commissionl6 to contest a West German Federal Constitutional
Court decision that made abortion illegal.'6 5 The women claimed
that their right to privacy under Article 8(1) was violated.16 6 The
ECtHR ultimately upheld the West German Federal Constitutional
Court's ruling.167  However, the ECtHR also noted that family
planning falls within the ambit of Article 8(1),168 leading the
157 HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 305-06.
158 LEACH, supra note 79, at 285.
159 Id. (referring to Odi~vre v. France, 2003-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51, 80-81 (2003)).
160 Id. at 286 (referring to Bensaid v. the United Kingdom, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
303, 320-21 (2001)).
161 See HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 306 (referencing
Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct. H.R. 97 (1992)).
162 Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6959/75,
5 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 130 (1976).
163 HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 311.
164 The Council of Europe used to have two bodies that established whether the
Convention had been violated - the European Commission on Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights. Klashtomy, supra note 26, at 425-26. The
Commission would first attempt to negotiate a settlement between an appealing party
and the state. Id If no settlement could be reached, the case would pass on to the court.
Id. Now, after the passage of Protocol 11, the European Court of Human Rights is the
only entity that makes decisions about an individual applicant's claim. See Jonathan L.
Black-Branch, Observing and Enforcing Human Rights under the Council of Europe:
The Creation ofa Permanent European Court ofHuman Rights, 3 BUFF. JOUR. INT'L L. 1
(1996).
165 Hernndez, supra note 12, at 330.
166 Id.
167 Id
168 Id
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Center for Reproductive Rights to assert that the court's decision
is that "an absolute prohibition on abortion would be an
impermissible interference with privacy rights under Article 8.",169
The 2007 decision of Tysiac v. Polando before the European
Court of Human Rights also demonstrates how the ECtHR has
used Article 8 to define reproductive rights.'7 ' Ms. Tysiac was a
resident of Poland with two children and a medical condition
described as "severe myopia." 72  This medical condition meant
she was "suffering from a disability of medium severity.""' After
she became pregnant, three medical experts informed her that "the
pregnancy and delivery constituted a risk to her eyesight."' 74
"However, either for legitimate medical reasons or due somehow
to the controversy surrounding abortion, Tysiac was unable to
secure the required certificate [for an abortion] from [the medical
experts]."' She then consulted a general practitioner, who gave
her the requisite certificate. 76 When Tysiac took the certificate to
a state hospital to obtain an abortion, however, she was informed
that her short-sightedness did not give her the sufficient medical
necessity for an abortion.'7 7  Tysiac delivered her baby a few
months later, and her eyesight significantly deteriorated shortly
thereafter.178
Tysiac brought a claim to the ECtHR, alleging that her rights
169 Written Comments for Vo v. France, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (Nov. 26 2003),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/rossrights/docs/cases/VoComm.pdf (citing Dinah
Shelton, International Law on Protection of the Foetus, in ABORTION AND PROTECTION
OF THE HUMAN FOETuS 7 (S.J. Fraukowski et al. eds., 1987)).
170 2007-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 219.
171 See generally Judith Resnik, From Page to Practice: Broadening the Lens for
Reproductive and Sexual Rights: The Production and Reproduction of Constitutional
Norms, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 226, 242-46 (2011) (placing the decision in
the context of other international decisions about abortion and reproductive rights).
172 Tysiac, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 226.
173 Id.
174 Id. 9.
175 Shannon K. Calt, Note and Comment, A. B. & C. v. Ireland: "Europe's Roe v.
Wade "?, 14 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 1189, 1211 (2010).
176 Tysiac, 2007-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 227.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 277-28.
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had been violated in two ways.'17  First, she argued that Poland
should have provided her with an abortion because under Polish
law, abortions were permissible when it threatens a woman's
health.'" Her second argument focused on the policies and
procedures operating in Poland. She argued that 'the absence of
a comprehensive legal framework to guarantee her rights by
appropriate procedural means' violated a positive obligation of
Poland to respect her Article 8 rights."'
While Tysiac's first claim proved unsuccessful, the ECtHR
nonetheless still granted her relief under Article 8 of the
Convention.182  The ECtHR held that Poland had not fulfilled its
positive obligations to protect Tysiac's right to effective respect
for her private life.88 Further, the ECtHR stated that Poland's
failure to provide Tysiac with the right to an abortion violated her
individual privacy rights.184 Essentially, the court concluded that
once a national legislature grants the right to abortion, it may not
"structure its legal framework in a way which would limit real
possibilities to obtain it." 8 1
Despite Judge Borrego's strongly-worded dissent,'8 6 in which
he claimed that the court "favours 'abortion on demand,"" 87 many
activists believe the court did not take a strong enough stance on
the right to abortion, arguing that the decision dealt merely with
Poland's legal structure.'88 Shannon Calt characterizes the court's
decision as evasive, where "the Court once again avoided
answering the question of when life begins under the Convention,
179 Calt, supra note 175, at 1211.
180 Id
181 Id
182 Id
183 Id. at 1212-13.
184 Tysiac, 2007-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 252.
185 Id. at 249; see also Nicolette Priaulx, Testing the Margin of Appreciation:
Therapeutic Abortion, Reproductive 'Rights' and the Intriguing Case of Tysiac v.
Poland, 15 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 361, 362 (2008).
186 Tysiac, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 262-66 (Borrego, J., dissenting). Borrego
includes emotionally-wrought phrases such as, "I would never have thought that the
Convention would go so far, and I find it frightening," and "the Court is neither a charity
institution nor the substitute for a national parliament." Id. at 262, 266.
187 Id. at 265.
188 See Calt, supra note 175, at 1215-16.
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presumably leaving that issue within the margin of appreciation
afforded the state."'" Nicolette Priaulx, a Senior Lecturer in Law
in the United Kingdom agrees, stating that the decision's legal
effect, contrary to the court's intentions, did not go far enough in
"impos[ing] a permissive abortion regime upon Poland-a 'right
to abortion."' 90  The case thus established states' positive
obligation to respect individuals' physical integrity, nothing more.
This ruling did, however, set the stage for the next abortion
case the ECtHR heard: A., B. and C. v. Ireland."' In 2005, three
Irish residents, A., B., and C., brought suit before the ECtHR.' 92
The women claimed violations of Articles 3 and 8, among other
Convention provisions.1 93  Each woman faced health
complications during their pregnancies that forced them to seek
abortions in England.194 After returning to Ireland, all three
suffered health complications.195 They alleged that these
complications were the result of Ireland's burdensome abortion
laws,19 6 considered the strictest in the Council of Europe.19 7
As the case progressed, commentators and scholars believed
the ECtHR's ruling could become "Europe's Roe v. Wade."'"
189 Id. at 1212.
190 Priaulx, supra note 185, at 371.
191 A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102332.
192 Calt, supra note 175, at 1216.
193 A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 113 (noting that Applicants
A. and B. complained under Articles 3, 8, 13 and 14, and Applicant C. complained under
Articles 2, 3, 8, 13 and 14).
194 Calt, supra note 175, at 1216-17. A., the first woman, was indigent and suffered
from alcoholism. Id. The second woman, B., had a substantial risk of ectopic pregnancy,
which is where the fetus would develop outside the uterus. Id The third applicant, C.,
had cancer, and she was unable to find anyone who could reassure her that the cancer
treatment would not harm the fetus. Id.
195 Id
196 Id.
197 See id. at 1190 ("In Ireland, abortion is effectively illegal.").
198 Id. at 1189 (specifically noting various commentators have referred to the case
as such); Paolo Ronchi, A, B and C v. Ireland: Europe 's Roe v. Wade Still Has to Wait?,
LAW. Q. REv. 365 (2011); Pro-life organizations file brief to defend Ireland abortion
ban: ADF attorneys represent Family Research Council in brief filed with European
Court of Human Rights, ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND (Nov. 17, 2008),
http://www.alliancealert.org/2008/11/17/pro-life-organizations-file-brief-to-defend-
ireland-abortion-ban/; J.C. von Krempach, A Comment on A, B, and C vs. Ireland,
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Because of the similarities between the right to privacy conferred
by the U.S. Constitution and the Convention, many thought the
court would decide that the right to privacy encompassed the right
to an abortion."' Furthermore, instead of the typical seven-
member panel, seventeen judges sat and heard arguments in A., B.
and C v. Ireland, a rare move that frequently signifies a
decision's importance to the ECtHR.20 0
Despite commentators' predictions, the ECtHR, in an 11-6
vote, held that the three applicants did not have a right to an
abortion in Ireland.2 01 Specifically, the ECtHR held that "Article 8
cannot, accordingly, be interpreted as conferring a right to
abortion."2 0 2 Although pro-life advocates had initially complained
about the court's decision to hear the case,2 03 they declared the
decision a victory, arguing that as a result of the ruling, the
Convention could no longer be interpreted to "weaken protections
afforded to human life guaranteed by a Member State."2 04 Instead
of providing a ceiling, pro-life advocates, like the European Centre
for Law and Justice, interpreted the decision as creating "a
floor.. .. [T]herefore[,] the Court can only supervise if restrictions
prescribed by a State to the protection of human life are not
abusive."20 5
TURTLE BAY AND BEYOND (December 16, 2010),
http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2010/abortion/a-comment-on-a-b-and-c-vs-ireland/.
199 See Ronchi, supra note 198 (noting the the similarity between the ECtHR's
decision and Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Roe).
200 Calt, supra note 175, at 1191 n.3. Such a decision comes from a body known as
the "grand chamber." Id.
201 See Ronchi, supra note 198.
202 A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 214 (Dec. 16,
2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102332.
203 News, Ireland Must Reject European Court's Abortion Judgment, Says
Intervener SPUC, Soc'Y FOR THE PROT. OF UNBORN CHILDREN (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://www.spuc.org.uk/news/releases/2010/decemberl6 (quoting John Smeaton,
national director of the Society for Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC), who said,
"This case was never about helping women faced with a crisis pregnancy. It was
instigated by the international abortion lobby, which has with the ultimate aim of forcing
governments across the globe to recognize access to abortion as a legal right.").
204 A. B. C. Irish abortion case: No human right to abortion under the Convention,
says the European Court offHuman Rights, EUROPEAN CTR. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE (Dec.
16, 2010), http://eclj.org/Releases/Read.aspx?GUID=b533673b-73b0-43ab-b7c6-
07e091ale706&s=eur/o20(Dec.%2016,%202010.
205 Id
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Despite the fact that the court did not find a fundamental right
to abortion, the ECtHR did comment on the positive obligations
Ireland has to women like Applicant C, who underwent cancer
treatment at the time of her pregnancy.206 The court also deemed
Irish abortion practice to be problematic, since the country does
not appropriately allow for abortions when women's lives are in
danger-even though the law explicitly protects women in such
circumstances. 20 7  Elizabeth Wicks, who writes on medical law,
constitutional law, and human rights, also notes that the ECtHR
acknowledged "the emergence of a European consensus that the
balance should fall in favour of the woman, at least when her
health or well-being is at stake, or at the early stages of the
pregnancy." 20 8 The recognition of this consensus is perhaps a sign
that the ECtHR might one day set abortion policy for all of the
Council of Europe nations.209
Thus, case law indicates that pro-choice advocates have
garnered significant victories using Article 8 of the European
Convention, the most commonly cited article in reproductive
rights cases. However, use of this article has not yet led the
European Court of Human Rights to decide that all Council of
Europe members bound by the convention must allow elective
abortions for their citizens. Going forward, pro-choice advocates
should consider whether stronger cases can be made using other
articles of the Convention.
D. Article 13 ofEuropean Convention ofHuman Rights
Article 13 of the Convention addresses the right to an effective
national remedy.2"0 This Article ensures that states provide some
206 A., B. and C., App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 22-26.
207 European Court of Human Rights Rules that Ireland Abortion Ban Violates
Human Rights, But Doesn't Go Far Enough, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (Dec. 16, 2010),
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/european-court-of-human-rights-rules-that-
ireland-abortion-ban-violates-human-rights-but-.
208 Wicks, supra note 25, at 565.
209 Id
210 Article 13 reads: "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official
capacity." European Convention, supra note 10, art. 13.
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form of remedy when Convention provisions are violated, 211 but it
does not require that states provide a particular remedy; instead, it
leaves the states discretion in implementing the remedy.2 12 Case
law for this Article is difficult to summarize because the
application of Article 13 depends upon the Articles the applicant
cites in his or her complaint.2 13 Although applicants have claimed
Article 13 violations in other reproductive rights cases such as A.,
B. and C. v. Ireland and Tysiac v. Poland, the ECtHR did not find
an Article 13 violation in those cases.214
V. RR v. Poland: newest ECtHR case on reproductive rights
On May 26, 2011, the European Court of Human Rights issued
a judgment in the case of R.R. v. the Republic of Poland.215 The
Court held unanimously that 45,0006 should be granted to the
Polish citizen who was denied an abortion.2 16 The citizen, Ms.
R.R., succeeded on a claim that she received insufficient medical
treatment, the result of which effectively denied her the right to an
abortion under the limited circumstances in which Poland allows
elective abortions.2 17
Although not all judges agreed, the Court also held that Poland
had violated both Article 3218 and Article 8219 of the Convention
and noted that the state's procedural safeguards needed to be fixed
so that women could access abortion under Polish domestic law. 220
Although the Court did not hold that Poland needed to guarantee
all women the right to an abortion, dicta in the opinion indicates
211 HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 443-46.
212 Id. at 445.
213 See id at 461.
214 See A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 271-74 (Dec.
16, 2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102332; Tysiac v.
Poland, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 219.
215 R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64 (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-104911.
216 Id. 5 (holding). The Court also granted monies for non-pecuniary damage
and for costs and expenses. Id
217 For a summary of Polish abortion law, see supra Part I.B.
218 R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 64 (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=00 1-104911.
219 Id. 3 (holding).
220 Id. %213-14.
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that the Court may be moving toward a more liberal stance on
reproductive rights.22 1
A. Facts
In December 2001, Ms. R.R., a 29 year old woman, visited Dr.
S.B. in a hospital.2 22 At that time, she learned that she was in the
sixth or seventh week of pregnancy.22 3 In the fourteenth and
eighteenth weeks of her pregnancy, Ms. R.R. returned to the
hospital for ultrasounds to check on the progress of her
pregnancy.22 4 At the later visit, on February 20, 2002, Ms. R.R.
was informed by her doctor that there might be some
malformation of the fetus. 225 Ms. R.R. indicated that she would be
interested in an abortion if the fetus were in fact deformed.22 6
After her interactions at the first hospital, Ms. R.R. visited a
second, public hospital for an ultrasound with Dr. 0.227 She
immediately received the results, which indicated that there was a
likelihood that the fetus was "suffering from some
malformation." 2 28 Dr. 0. recommended that Ms. R.R. undergo a
genetic examination at that time, using the technique of
* 229amniocentesis.
Days later, Ms. R.R. visited another clinic for an ultrasound.2 30
The clinic was private, and Ms. R.R. did not have a referral, so she
had to pay for the service.231 Like her three previous ultrasounds,
the results of the scan showed that the fetus had an unidentified
malformation.2 32 The doctor recommended genetic testing.23 3
221 See infra text accompanying notes 229-231.
222 R.R. v. Poland, App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., T 64 (May 26, 2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104911.
223 Id
224 Id 9.
225 See id
226 Id
227 The exact date of this visit is not in the court opinion but it would be between
Feb. 20 and Feb. 28. See id. T 11-12.
228 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 12.
229 Id
230 See id. 13.
231 Id
232 See id
233 Id.
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After four different ultrasounds, Ms. R.R. visited a specialist in
clinical genetics, Professor K. Sz.23 4  Professor K. Sz.
recommended that Ms. R.R. get a referral for genetic testing from
her doctor so that the testing would be paid for by the government
at a public hospital.2 35 Ms. R.R. asked her first doctor, Dr. S.B.,
for such a referral.2 36 She was refused.237
In the first week of March, Ms. R.R. went with her husband to
again visit Dr. S.B., demanding "termination of the pregnancy." 238
Dr. S.B. refused to perform an abortion and informed the couple
that they could appeal his decision for review before a panel of
hospital doctors.2 39 Ms. R.R. chose not to appeal the decision and
instead went to another public hospital on March 11. Ms. R.R.
again asked for an abortion, but she was turned down.240 She
received a referral for a university hospital, which she visited on
March 14.241
At her visit on March 14, Ms. R.R. was refused a genetic
examination.24 2 She was also criticized for considering an
abortion. 2 43 Another ultrasound was performed, as were urine and
blood tests.2 44 The ultrasound was inconclusive as to the fetal
deformation, but Ms. R.R.'s discharge record from March 16
stated that "the foetus was affected with developmental
abnormalities."24 5
Ms. R.R. then approached Professor K. Sz. again, who refused
to provide her with the genetic referral.246 The next day, she
approached Dr. K.R. to obtain it.247 Although the facts are in
234 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 14.
235 See id.
236 See id
237 Id.
238 Id 17.
239 Id.
240 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 18-19.
241 Id. 120.
242 Id.
243 Id
244 Id.
245 See id.
246 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 21.
247 Id. 22.
[Vol. XXXVIII680
ABORTION IN EUROPE
dispute about the exact conversation that they had,248 she did not
receive a referral from him.249 She "again unsuccessfully asked
Dr[.] S.B. for a referral." 250 Although the government disputed the
fact that Ms. R.R. never got a referral, no referral documentation
was submitted to the European Court of Human Rights.2 51
Regardless of whether Ms. R.R. in fact obtained a referral, she
underwent genetic testing on March 26 at twenty-three weeks
pregnant.2 52 The hospital told Ms. R.R. that it would take two
weeks for her to receive the test results; she received them on
April 9.253 The results "confirmed that the karyotype indicated the
presence of Turner syndrome" and indicated that an abortion
should be contemplated "'under the provisions of the 1993
law"' 254 and "'taken with due regard to the parents' opinion."' 25 5
After receiving these test results, Ms. R.R. again asked the
local public hospital for an abortion.25 6 She was told that it was
"too late by then." 257 On July 11, Ms. R.R. "gave birth to a baby
girl affected with Turner syndrome."258
Unlike other cases where applicants first came to the ECtHR
without seeking legal relief in their own countries,259 Ms. R.R.
initially sought criminal legal relief in Poland.26 0 When her case
was denied, she appealed, and was again denied any relief.26 1 She
then filed civil suit against the doctors and hospitals with whom
248 See id (explaining that the government says that he could not refer, and Ms.
R.R. says that he told her he would not perform genetic testing because she would then
go get an abortion.).
249 See id.
250 Id 23.
251 Id. 24.
252 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., T 28.
253 Id. 33.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. 33
257 Id.
258 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 137.
259 A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 271-74 (Dec. 16,
2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102332 (finding that
domestic remedies did not need to be exhausted).
260 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 38.
261 Id. 39-42.
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she had interacted.262 Initially, she received relief only for privacy
issues, as one of the doctors had "disclosed information relating
to ... [her] health and private life in connection with her
pregnancy." 2 63 Later, after appeal, Mr. R.R. received relief in the
Polish court system for failure to refer for genetic testing and for
the breach of her right to make an informed decision about her
pregnancy.2 64 On July 30, 2004, Ms. R.R. applied to the European
Court of Human Rights for further relief.265
B. ECtHR Decision
In considering Ms. R.R.'s case, the ECtHR first analyzed
whether Poland's domestic law provides any remedies for
violation of the Convention-or whether Ms. R.R. did in fact
qualify as a victim unable to obtain sufficient relief in her
country.266 Unlike the case of A., B. and C. v. Ireland,26 7 the Court
noted that Ms. R.R. had already sought and been denied relief
within her home country.268 However, despite the fact that the
Supreme Court of Poland acknowledged that a patient has "a right
of access to information relevant to her or his health" 269 and that
Ms. R.R. "had suffered distress, anxiety and humiliation,"2 70 the
ECtHR indicated that a victim's relief must be considered as a
whole. The ECtHR then clarified that the award rendered could
not "be regarded as financial redress commensurate with the
nature of the damage."2 7 1
The ECtHR also noted that Ms. R.R. was raising a complaint
about the way that the Polish system operated;2 7 2 instead of
262 Id. 143.
263 Id
264 See id j 48-57.
265 Id. 1.
266 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 109.
267 A., B. and C. v. Ireland, App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., 271-74 (Dec. 16,
2010), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102332 (finding that
domestic remedies did not need to be exhausted).
268 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 38.
269 Id. 102.
270 Id
271 Id 108.
272 See id
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complaining about the law itself, Ms. R.R. was effectively
complaining about "the way in which the laws were applied in
practice to her case."273 Following precedent, the ECtHR did not
choose to redefine the "right to life" from Article 2 of the
Convention.274 Instead, the ECtHR considered whether Ms. R.R.'s
rights had been violated under Articles 8, 3, and 13.275 This
comment considers Articles 8, 3, and 13 in turn, as did the ECtHR.
1. Article 8
The ECtHR's analysis of Ms. R.R.'s remedies under Article 8
is not surprising, given previous case law.276 The ECtHR first
acknowledged that reproductive decisions fall under "private
life." 277 Then, the Court explained that such interference in private
life must be "justified in terms of the second paragraph [of Article
8]," such that "the interference corresponds to a pressing social
need ... proportionate to one of the legitimate aims pursued by the
authorities."2 7 8 This overview also coincides with existing case
law on Article 8.279
The R.R. v. Poland court then addressed the issue of positive
obligations, deeming Poland to be under the positive obligation to
''secure to its citizens their right to effective respect for their
physical and psychological integrity,"280 al obligation which may
require state action. 281  The ECtHR followed its discussion of
positive obligations with the reminder that States can make the
final decision about whether to grant reproductive freedoms, citing
A., B. and C. v. Ireland.28 2 However, the Court acknowledged that
consensus exists "amongst a substantial majority of the
Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing
abortion and that most Contracting Parties have in their legislation
273 Id 116.
274 European Convention, supra note 10, at 6.
275 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 121.
276 See supra Part III.iii for discussion of Article 8 case law.
277 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.,1181.
278 Id. T 183.
279 See id; see, e.g., Olsson v. Sweden, 130 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 31-32 (1988).
280 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 185.
281 Id
282 Id. 186.
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resolved the conflicting rights of the foetus and the mother in
favour of greater access to abortion."28 3
Next, the ECtHR applied Article 8 to the circumstances of this
particular case. The ECtHR initially specified that this decision
was not about whether abortion is a fundamental right, but instead
about whether Ms. R.R. could access the rights granted under
Polish law.2 84 The ECtHR also noted that it was faced with a
combination of issues, such as right of access to information and
the right to decide about termination of a pregnancy.28 5
The ECtHR followed this initial note with a qualification,
however, that the "starting point for the Court's analysis is the
question of an individual's access to information about her or his
health," not the right to privacy or the right to have an abortion.2 86
Despite its qualification, however, the ECtHR next commented
that "the effective exercise of this right is often decisive for the
possibility of exercising personal autonomy,"2 87 implying that the
ECtHR recognizes that it cannot fully separate the two rights of
access to information and right to reproductive health decisions.28 8
Emphasizing the relevance of the information that Ms. R.R.
would have received2 89 and the organizational confusion that she
faced,2 90 the ECtHR then concluded that Poland violated Ms.
R.R.'s rights under Article 8.291 Specifically, the Court concluded
that Poland violated its positive obligations to "safeguard the
applicant's right to respect for her private life in the context of
controversy over whether she should have had access to, firstly,
prenatal genetic tests and subsequently, an abortion, had the
applicant chosen this option."292 The ECtHR also highlighted the
timing of the case, noting that a span of at least four weeks passed
between when the medical suspicions began and the legal time-
283 Id.
284 Id 196.
285 Id. 188.
286 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 196.
287 Id 197.
288 Id.
289 Id. I 199.
290 Id. T 198.
291 Id. T 214.
292 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 211.
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limit for an abortion expired.2 93
2. Article 3
Unlike other decisions about reproductive rights,294 the ECtHR
also used Article 3 to grant the petitioner relief. Although this
portion of the opinion is short,295 the court noted that "ill-treatment
requires a minimum level of severity" in order to qualify under
Article 3, an inquiry that depends on all the facts and
circumstances of the person's particular case.2 96  The ECtHR
reiterated its previous case law in explaining that such treatment
does not need to be intentionally humiliating or debasing but
instead will be decided based on how the applicant was actually
treated.297
Applying the facts of Ms. R.R.'s case to Article 3, then, the
ECtHR concluded that the applicant's suffering reached the
minimum threshold of severity, meaning that her Article 3 rights
were violated.2 98  The ECtHR did not specify whether the
treatment was "inhuman" or "degrading," 299 but instead analyzed
the specific events that led Ms. R.R. to feel "humiliated." 30 0 Some
of the facts that the Court considered in this analysis included the
applicant's feelings: she felt greatly vulnerable and "suffered acute
anguish through having to think about how she and her family
would be able to ensure the child's welfare, happiness and
appropriate long-term medical care."30' The ECtHR also noted the
amount of time that passed between her first ultrasound and the
suspicion about the condition (six weeks), and the fact that no
293 Id. 203.
294 See supra Part III.B for a discussion of previous ECtHR case law under Article
3.
295 The Court's assessment and analysis in this section is only 15 paragraphs long,
in contrast with the Court's assessment and analysis of Article 8, which is 35 paragraphs
long. See R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 148-162, 179-214.
296 Id 148.
297 Id. 151.
298 Id. 161.
299 European Convention, supra note 10, at 6. Most commentary divides the
provision of Article 3 into these two categories.
300 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 160.
301 Id. 159.
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doctor noticed this time lapse.302 The ECtHR further found that
the fact that "the diagnostic services which she requested early on
were at all times available and that she was entitled as a matter of
domestic law to avail herself of them" has worsened Ms. R.R.'s
suffering.3 03
3. Article 13
The ECtHR concluded its analysis by briefly addressing Ms.
R.R.'s claim that her rights under Article 13 were violated.3 04 She
argued that her rights were breached by a lack of ability to
challenge "the advisability of and access to prenatal examinations
in a timely manner." 305  The Court responded to her claim by
noting that its Article 8 provisions had already covered her
complaints in this regard.306 Thus, the ECtHR concluded that this
case presented no distinct Article 13 issue.307
C. Separate Opinions
After deciding that Articles 3 and 8 applied to Ms. R.R.'s
claim and dismissing the Article 13 claim, all seven judges agreed
with the decision of damages. 0 Two judges nevertheless wrote
separately to clarify their beliefs as to which Articles of the
Convention had been violated. Although he signed on to the
majority's finding that Article 3 was violated,3 09 Judge de
Gaetano 3 10 disagreed with the application of Article 8. He wrote
302 Id
303 Id. 160.
304 Id. f 215-18.
305 Id. 1 215.
306 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 218.
307 Following this portion of the opinion, the Court also addressed the issue of
damages. Id 220-25. Ms. R.R. claimed damages for her costs and expenses incurred
before the Polish court and before the ECtHR. Id. t 226. These damages included
lawyers' fees, travel costs to meet with various advocates, and telephone bills. See id.
226-37. The Court decided to award Ms. R.R. damages of EUR 15,000 to cover the
expenses that she could properly document, since they seemed to be "reasonable as to
quantum." Id 233.
308 Id. 5 (holding).
309 Id. at 1 (de Gaetano, J., partially dissenting).
310 Judge de Gaetano represents Malta, a country with one of the most conservative
abortion policies in Europe. See U.N. POPULATION DIV. DEPT. OF EcoN. AND Soc.
AFFAIRS, Abortion Policies: A Global Review, at 125-26 (2002) [hereinafter U.N.,
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that the analysis of Article 8 only makes it more difficult for the
court "in regard to the issue of the determination of the beginning
of life and the unborn child's protection.""' Citing
Briiggemann,3 12 de Gaetano argued that the court has clearly
concluded that pregnancy does not pertain only to privacy, but
also to the unborn child's life and interests."' Therefore, he
believed the ECtHR should have decided the case under Article 6,
not Article 8.31
Judge Bratza, representing the United Kingdom,3 15 also wrote a
separate opinion. He agreed that the ECtHR properly applied
Article 8 but disagreed as to its application of Article 3.316 The
majority's opinion about Article 3, he wrote, "extend[s] the scope
of the Article too far.",3 " Acknowledging that Ms. R.R. was not
treated well, he nevertheless thought that she was not subjected to
the minimum level of severity necessary to qualify for an Article 3
violation. 18
D. Analysis of the Court Decision
Despite the recent decision of A., B. & C. v. Ireland, where the
ECtHR seemingly foreclosed conversation about the right to
abortion and left determinations about its legality to the individual
Abortion Policies], available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/
abortion/doc/malta.doc (describing Malta's current abortion policies, which prohibit
abortion in all circumstances). Italian Judge Ann Power-Forde, who represents another
nation with conservative abortion policies, did not serve on the case of R.R. v. Poland.
Composition of the Court, EuR. COURT OF HUM. RTS.,
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/en/header/the+court/
the+court/judges+of+the+court/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2012); see also U.N., Abortion
Policies, supra, at 73-75 (describing Italy's current abortion policies, and noting that in
practice, women's access to abortion varies considerably throughout the country).
311 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., T 5.
312 Briggemann & Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 6959/75, 3
Eur. H.R. Rep. 244 (1981).
313 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., T 5.
314 Id 4.
315 Composition of the Court, supra note 3 10.
316 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., annex 1-5 (Bratza partially
dissenting).
317 Id. annex15.
318 Id. Judge Bratza did not, however, specify whether reproductive rights issues
could ever qualify under Article 3. See id.
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states, R.R. v. Poland demonstrates that the ECtHR may be willing
to reassess its abortion policy. The ECtHR's discussion of Article
8 mentions the right to abortion along with the right to access
information,"' and the court notes the growing number of states
that recognize abortion as a fundamental right.3 20 Moreover, the
way that the ECtHR used Article 3 sets this case apart from other
decisions on reproductive rights.321  As the ECtHR considers other
abortion-related cases, abortion advocates should use Article 3 as a
backdrop for their fight in securing women's reproductive freedom
internationally, as discussed in Section 2 below.
1. Article 8: mentioning the consensus model
In its discussion of Article 8, the ECtHR did not deviate
significantly from recent case law on abortion. The ECtHR
initially qualified its Article 8 analysis by stating that it would
look only at how the law was applied, instead of considering the
validity of the underlying law. Thus, the court chose a more
conservative approach with regard to abortion law, consistent with
its methodology in A., B. and C. v. Ireland.3 22 The ECtHR also
implied that it would not decide countries' rights to provide
abortions solely in such extreme circumstances. Instead, the
ECtHR focused specifically on the right to better medical
information.
319 Id. T 199 ("The Court emphasises the relevance of the information which the
applicant sought to obtain by way of genetic testing to the decision concerning
continuation of her pregnancy.").
320 Id. 186 ("there is indeed a consensus amongst a substantial majority of the
Contracting States of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion and that most
Contracting Parties have in their legislation resolved the conflicting rights of the foetus
and the mother in favour of greater access to abortion."); see generally Europe's
Abortion Rules, BBC (Feb. 12, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6235557.stm (detailing
domestic abortion law throughout Europe).
321 See supra part III.B for a discussion of previous cases under Article 3.
322 See Ronchi, supra note 198, at 365 (explaining the Court's analysis in A., B. and
C. v. Ireland).
323 See R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., TT 197-199 (noting that "[t]he right
of access to such information falling within the ambit of the notion of private life can be
said to comprise, in the Court's view, on the one hand, a right to obtain available
information on one's condition" and further detailing this right to access medical
information); see generally Guest Blogger, R.R. v. Poland: Health Rights under Art. 8
ECHR, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (June 2, 2011), http://strasbourgobservers.com/
2011/06/02/r-r-v-poland-health-rights-under-art-8-echr/ (predicting how this decision
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Despite its seemingly limited holding, the ECtHR implicitly
did more than address access to information in R.R. v. Poland.
While it did not address the right to abortion specifically, the
Court repeatedly referred to the applicant's right to terminate a
pregnancy.3 24 If the ECtHR had wanted to confine its analysis
only to the issue of access to information, it could have left out the
language on abortion altogether. Instead, the decision includes
statements such as "the foetus' condition and health constitute an
element of the pregnant woman's health" and "the effective
exercise of this right is often decisive for the possibility of
exercising personal autonomy."3 25 By implying such an element
of choice in its analysis, it used language that pro-choice
advocates may use in trying to garner more reproductive rights for
women; such language also conveys that this case is not only
about medical choice but also about the right to choose to have an
abortion.
In its opinion, the ECtHR also mentioned that most states in
Europe allow elective abortions in their domestic laws.326 Since
the ECtHR uses a consensus model of decision-making,2 noting
such opinions occur in a "substantial majority" of member states
implies that the ECtHR might take a different stance on abortion
in the future.32 8 Again, if the ECtHR wanted to stifle pro-choice
advocates from bringing more pro-choice claims in the future, the
court could have left this language out altogether or noted that pro-
life policies are acceptable within its member states. Choosing to
use this language instead implies that the ECtHR might take a
more liberal, pro-choice stance in its future analysis.3 29
will pave the way for more controversial decisions about medical treatment, such as
euthanasia and forced sterilization cases where applicants argue inadequate access to
health information).
324 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 1 79, 122, 134, 203; see also Grigor
Puppinck, Short Comments on the ECHR Judgment RR. v. Poland, TURTLE BAY AND
BEYOND (May 31, 2011), http://www.turtlebayandbeyond.org/2011/abortion/3509/
(discussing the way the court in R.R. v. Poland "improperly focuses its analysis on
abortion" instead of only addressing the presented issue of genetic prenatal testing).
325 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 197.
326 See generally Europe's Abortion Rules, supra note 320.
327 See supra text accompanying notes 114-116.
328 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 186.
329 Such a liberal stance would be consistent with the role that the European Court
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2. Article 3: details about how Ms. R.R. suffered anguish
Unlike previous case law on reproductive rights,3 30 the ECtHR
also used Article 3 to grant the applicant's claims. The Court did
not indicate whether its decision fell within "inhuman" or
"degrading" treatment, though it did note the difference between
the two categories.33 ' The ECtHR also did not specifically
indicate its deviation from previous case law, but writers have
noted that the Court's use of Article 3 is unique.3 32 Other Article 3
cases have involved prisoners' treatment or literal torture
situations." Here, the ECtHR almost equated the waiting period
for genetic testing and information about fetal deformity with
torture.334
This unique analysis gives other women the opportunity to
argue that they have been essentially "tortured" as they wait for
health care decisions. As abortion laws change in various nations
and public consensus builds for women's rights, the opinion might
motivate women to argue that they have suffered "anguish" 3 5 as
they have waited to see if the laws will change. In countries
where women must wait a specific period of time before they may
obtain an abortion, they might also argue that waiting causes them
to suffer. These women could cite the portion of the opinion
where the Court mentions that "no regard was had to the temporal
aspect of the applicant's predicament." ,3
Some interest groups have already picked up on this strategy in
of Human Rights has taken in the past. See generally LEACH, supra note 79 (detailing
cases that have shaped European policies).
330 See supra Part I.B.
331 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., 149-150.
332 Alexandra Timmer, R.R. v. Poland: Of Reproductive Health, Abortion and
Degrading Treatment, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (May 31, 2011),
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2011/05/3 1/r-r-v-poland-of-reproductive-health-abortion-
and-degrading-treatment/.
333 See generally HARRIS, O'BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 120, at 72-80
(describing case law under Article 3).
334 European Court ofHuman Rights Finds an Abortion-Related Violation Amounts
to Inhumane and Degrading Treatment, STOP TORTURE IN HEALTH CARE (May 26,
2011), http://www.stoptortureinhealthcare.org/news-and-resources/forced-sterilization/
european-court-human-rights-finds-abortion-related-violation.
335 R.R., App No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., T 159.
336 Id
690 [Vol. XXXVIII
ABORTION IN EUROPE
advocating for an expanded definition of torture. One Huffington
Post article indicates that even though
"we rarely hear about ill-treatment by health providers as part of
more routine medical practice[,] . . . [t]hat doesn't mean it's not
happening." 3 " The article cites various reports by Human Rights
Watch that highlight such inhuman or degrading health care
treatment around the world, particularly in Egypt, Libya, Jordan,
Iraq, China, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and India.3 38 In addition, in
2011, the organization Stop Torture in Health Care was formed to
draw attention to the fact that cruel and inhuman treatment may be
done "in the name of health care."339 If they have not already,
these interest groups should note the ECtHR's willingness to
address the intersection of torture and health care decisions and
encourage applicants to use Article 3 as a basis when filing suit for
reproductive rights' issues.
E. Problems with an Article 3 strategy
Using an "Article 3 strategy" may help interest groups push for
pro-choice policies throughout Europe. Even if the ECtHR grants
such a right, however, domestic laws may not automatically adapt
to the specifications of the Court. Although all member states
have ratified the Convention, the aftermath of previous Court
opinions show how difficult change can be for member states.34 0
For example, after the Hirst v. United Kingdom341 decision
regarding prisoners' voting rights, the United Kingdom failed to
implemented reforms consistent with the recommendations of the
Court.342 Even seven years later, after revisiting prisoners' rights
337 Joe Amon, Torture in Health Care, HUFFINGTON PosT (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-amon/torture-in-health-care_b_433503.html.
338 Id.
339 Campaign to Stop Torture in Healthcare Launched, HARM REDUCTION INT'L
BLOG (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.ihra.net/contents/928.
340 See Colin Murray, The Backlash Against Prisoner Voting Reform in the UK,
HUM. RTs. IN IRELAND (Jan 28, 2011), http://www.humanrights.ie/
index.php/2011/01/28/the-backlash-against-prisoner-voting-rights-in-the-uk/
(mentioning the lack of changes in domestic law after Hirst v. UK and Greens v. UK,
two ECtHR decisions about prisoner voting).
341 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187 (2005).
342 C. R. G. Murray, A Perfect Storm: Parliament and Prisoner
Disenfranchisement, PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS (Jan 21, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1898188 (click "Download this
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in Ireland, scholars believe that the United Kingdom is still
procrastinating.3 43 Even if interest groups follow an "Article 3
strategy," and the ECtHR adopts their recommendations, some
countries may not be willing to change their domestic laws.
A recent report bolsters this opinion by explaining that the
ECtHR overreaches in forming domestic law.344  The report,
published by the right-leaning think tank Policy Exchange,
suggests that Britain should seriously consider withdrawing from
the European Court of Human Rights, or at least work to find a
better solution for how British domestic law could interact with
the international treaty.34 5 Conservative members of Parliament in
Britain and recently-elected Tories supported this attempt to
"reassert Britain's sovereignty" over international treaty-creating
law, as did other members of the international community.34 6
While such opinions seem to be coming out of Britain alone, they
nevertheless could influence other states like Ireland and Poland,
two of the countries with strict abortion laws.34 7 Such influence
might hinder progress for pro-choice advocates, even if the ECtHR
is willing to conclude that member states should allow elective
abortion.
Though interest groups have already picked up on the strategy
of linking torture to health care decision, there are other
difficulties with such a strategy. Although the ECtHR's Article 3
analysis seems to set precedent for future cases, the partially
dissenting opinion of Judge Nicholas Bratza seems more
important, given Bratza's current leadership position. After this
opinion came out, Nicholas Bratza was elected the President of the
Paper").
343 Id.
344 MICHAEL PINTO-DUSCHINSKY, BRINGING RIGHTS BACK HOME: MAKING HUMAN
RIGHTS COMPATIBLE WITH PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN THE UK (Blair Gibbs ed.,
2001), available at http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/
PXKeepingHuman Rights at HomeWEB_07_02_11 .pdf.
345 Id.
346 Bagehot, Britain's Mounting Fury Over Sovereignty, ECONOMIST (Feb. 10,
2011), http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/02/prisoners votingrights (last
accessed Oct. 29, 2012).
347 See supra Parts LB-C for more detailed information about Irish and Polish
abortion law.
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European Court of Human Rights.3 48 As the sole judge who
disagreed with the idea of treating this case under Article 3,349 it is
hard to imagine that he will permit case law on abortion to shift in
the direction of Article 3 alone.
It is also possible that activists who protest torture under
Article 3 will not agree with such a strategy from the pro-choice
lobby. For example, a 2009 article in the Minnesota Christian
Examiner suggests that some who oppose torture will remain true
to their pro-life views.3 50 Although the article does not specifically
reference international law, such a belief system is likely reflected
throughout the world and particularly in European countries with
strong Catholic traditions."' The strategy might bring more
attention to how much anguish people suffer when considering
abortion, but it might also lead to even more negative publicity
from the Catholic pro-life lobby.
F. Implications for Future Cases
Despite the fact that the ECtHR did not grant the universal
right to an abortion in A., B. and C. v. Ireland, R.R. v. Poland
leaves room for abortion advocates to latch on to recent ECtHR
analysis in trying to advance reproductive rights policy. A recent
case related to Polish abortion law shows that advocates have done
just that.
348 Antoine Buyse, Nicholas Bratza Elected Court President, ECHR BLOG ( July 5,
2011), http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/nicholas-bratza-elected-court-
president.html.
349 European Convention, supra note 10, at 6.
350 Carl Nelson, Commentary: Pro-life and Anti-Torture: A Consistent Ethic of the
Sanctity of Life, MINN. CHRISTIAN EXAM'R (July 2009),
http://www.minnesota.christianexaminer.com/Articles/Jul09/ArtJul09 oped3.html
(describing how the unborn are still considered a protected class, just like those who
experience torture).
351 News stories from 2011 also indicate that Polish Catholics are not retreating
from a pro-life stance. PRO, a pro-life lobby, attempted to make Polish law even less
permissive for women seeking abortions by taking out the exceptions to the law. See
Steven Ertelt, Poland Casts First Vote for Bill Banning All Abortions (July 1, 2011),
http://www.lifenews.com/2011/07/01/poland-casts-first-vote-for-bill-banning-all-
abortions/; see also Dave Bohon, Polish Abortion Ban Defeated; Pro-Life Leaders
Optimistic (Sept. 13, 2011), http://thenewamerican.com/world-news/europe/item/8837-
polish-abortion-ban-defeated-pro-life-leaders-optimistic (noting that the amendment
failed last summer but that pro-life activists are still advancing a strategy to make the
abortion law more restrictive).
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The case, P. and S. v. Poland,3 52 was submitted by a fourteen
year old, Ms. P. and her mother, Ms. S.. The facts state that the
young woman had been raped, resulting in pregnancy.35 3 Like Ms.
R.R., Ms. P. requested an abortion in multiple hospitals in
different cities throughout Poland.354
In this case, however, Ms. P. had a legal right to an abortion
under Polish law allowing for abortion because there were "strong
grounds for believing that the pregnancy was the result of a
criminal act, certified by a prosecutor,"35 5 and Ms. P. had received
a certificate confirming this decision from the prosecutor.35 6
Unlike Ms. R.R., there were a number of articles published in the
national press about Ms. P., and she was subject to public
harassment from people outside the final hospital she visited,
which refused to give her an abortion because "a lot of pressure
had been put on the hospital with a view to discouraging it from
performing the abortion"" and "the hospital was receiving
numerous e-mails from persons criticising the applicants for
having decided to allow the first applicant to have an abortion."358
As this comment indicates, most abortion cases focus
primarily on Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention, two Articles
which Ms. P. and Ms. S. used in their argument. However, in this
case, the applicants also brought a claim under Article 3.15' The
Court held in favor of the applicant that the Convention had been
violated.6 o
In the holding that Article 3 had been violated, however, there
were four key facts emphasized by the ECtHR. First, the decision
352 P. and S. v. Poland, App. No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -114098.
353 Id. TT 5-8.
354 Id. T$ 11-28.
355 Id. 100.
356 Id. 10.
357 Id. 27.
358 P. and S., App No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., 27.
359 Id. 152-156.
360 Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Teenage Girl Who Was Raped
Should Have Been Given Unhindered Access to Abortion (Oct. 2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra-press/pages/search.aspx?i=003-4140612-4882633
(click on hyperlink under word "here") (last visited Nov. 13, 2012). The Court's
judgment is not final until three months after the initial judgment has been released. Id.
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hinged on the very young age of the applicant - she was only
fourteen years old.36 1 Second, the ECtHR noted that the domestic
law permitted an abortion under these circumstances, as the
applicant had received a certificate from the prosecutor.36 2 The
third critical fact involved Ms. P's injuries: "the medical certificate
issued immediately afterwards confirmed bruises on her body and
concluded that physical force had been used to overcome her
resistance." 3 63 Finally, the applicant was harassed by members of
the general public, instead of protected by the public hospital that
she had chosen.*
None of the critical facts from P. and S. v. Poland were at
play in R.R. v. Poland, so, in the future, it remains to be seen
whether the ECtHR will hold that there have been violations of
Article 3 in cases with less egregious facts, such as where the
applicant is older or has not been raped. Nevertheless, R.R. v.
Poland indicates that the ECtHR is still considering expanding the
scope of women's rights throughout Europe, even if not through a
blanket acceptance of abortion.
Despite its mention of consensus-building throughout Europe,
recent ECtHR case law and the continued connection to pro-life
groups indicate that an international consensus from the ECtHR
will take some time, and pro-choice advocates may have to wait.365
The battle is not worth surrendering, however, as the ECtHR has
decided to expand its case law with the use of Article 3 in R.R. v.
Poland and P. and S. v. Poland,36 6 actions that indicate that a more
liberal stance on abortion policy in Europe may be on its way.
361 P. and S., App No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., 161 (stating that "[flor the
Court's assessment of this complaint it is of a cardinal importance that the first applicant
was at the material time only fourteen years old."). The Court cannot overlook the fact
that the medical certificate issued immediately afterwards confirmed bruises on her body
and concluded that physical force had been used to overcome her resistance.
362 Id. ("The certificate issued by the prosecutor confirmed that her pregnancy had
resulted from unlawful intercourse.")
363 Id.
364 Id. 164 ("The authorities not only failed to provide protection to her, having
regard to her young age and vulnerability, but further compounded the situation.")
365 But see Chad M. Gerson, Development: Toward an International Standard of
Abortion Rights: Two Obstacles, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 753, 761 (suggesting the United
Nations quickly adopt a uniform strategy, as "avoiding resolution will create greater
problems in the future").
366 R.R., App. No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R.
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